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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
CONVEYANCE BY AN EXECUTOR UNDER A DISCRETIONARY
POWER TO SELL
The doubt and subsequent disagreement concerning the interpretation to
be given the decision in Eberly v. Koller, 209 Pa. 298, 58 A 558 (1904),
has been resolved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the recent case of In
re Shaffer's Estate, 61 A. 2d 872, Dec. 4, 1948, At. Rep. Ad. Sheets. The Eberly
case arose on a case stated to determine whether an executor could make title to
real estate. The facts were, concisely, these: L. F. Eberly died testate in 1895
and in his will directed, inter alia, as follows: "I hereby authorize and empower
my executors to sell all or any of my estate, real or personal, not herein specifically
bequeathed or devised, either at public or private sale, and to execute and de-
liver good and sufficient deeds for all real estate sold, for the purpose of execut-
ing this will." Plaintiff, as surviving executor, advertised and sold the property
to the defendant, but the defendant refused to accept the deed, alleging that the
plaintiff had no power to make title. The trial court held adversely to the plain-
tiff, saying, in effect, since the proposed sale was for the purpose of distribution
only and not for the payment of debts the object could be properly accomplished
in a proceeding in partition. The court concluded by saying, "The will in this
instance does not work a conversion." The Supreme Court affirmed on the opinion
of the court below. The necessary implication of the decision is that an executor
may not convey real estate under a testamentary discretionary power where the
will does not also work a conversion. Many lawyers and title insurance com-
panies refused to approve or insure a title which purported to pass by a deed
given by an executor under a discretionary power of sale, relying on the Eberly
case as authority. The cases of Kreise v. Cortledge, 262 Pa. 55, 104 A 885 (1918)
and Swift's Appeal, 87 Pa. 502, were often cited for the same principle. It has
been suggested however, 47 DICK. L. REV. 193 at 195 and 197, that the latter
two decisions could be sustained on other grounds or otherwise distinguished.
Nevertheless the decision in the Eberly case created a great deal of discussion in
legal circles. One jurist argued that the proposition for which the case was cited
was not justified by the facts; while others were firm in their belief that if it
was not justified by the facts; while others were firm in, their belief that if it was
the rule at one time it no longer prevailed as such. Mr. George Balmer, Esq., in
47 DICK. L. REV. 193, at 201 (May 3, 1943) submitted that, "Eberly v. Koller
is no longer the law in Pennsylvania and that in order for an executor to exercise
a power of sale given to him in a will there need not be an equitable conversion.
This is shown by the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, Sec. 30, 20 P. S. 716;
Kemerer v. Jobnstone, 318 Pa. 526, 179 A 67 (1935); Davidson v. Bright, 267
Pa..580, 110 A 301 (1920), and the line of cases following it; and Burkerboff v.
Martin, 28 D &C 227 (1937)."
NOTES
The Supreme Court in In re Shaffer's Estate, decided Nov. 8, 1948, states that,
"The Supreme Court reviewing the Eberly case (in 1904) merely affirmed the lower
court's arbitrary choice of a supposedly more expeditious means (i. e., partition)
of carrying out the provisions of the particular will." The court points out that
in the Eberly case, the lower court was concerned with the efficacy of partition
in the circumstances and not with any power of sale as its one citation (Reid v.
Clendenning, 193 Pa. 406) plainly indicates. Following this interpretation, the
rule for which Eberly v. Koller was so often cited never had Supreme Court af-
firmance. The court continues by saying, "Other and more recent decisions confirm
the correct rule to be that, even though a will does not effect an equitable con-
version, a discretionary power of sale thereunder is sufficient to authorize the
executor to convey the decedent's real estate [Italics supplied]. See, Kemerer v,
Johnstone, 318 Pa. 526, 179 A 67 (1935), quoting with approval from Lentz v.
Boyer, 81 Pa. 325, 327, 328; Davidson v. Bright, 267 Pa. 580, 110 A 301 (1920);
In re Cooper's Estate, 206 Pa. 628, 56 A 67 (1904); and Livingood v. Heffner,
11 A. 187, 9 Sadler 526, 530, 531 (Pa., 1888). See also Act of June 7, 1917,
P. L. 447, Sec. 30, 20 P. S. 716." Thus, the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth
affirmed what many jurists had consistently contended was the rule and what
Mr. George Balmer, Esq., predicted in his 1943 paper published in 47 DICK. L.
REV. 193.
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